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21. Introduction.
Economic models often assume identical agents with identical, and often perfect,
information.  While these assumption clearly do not hold in real-life situations, it is often largely
unknown to what extent these assumptions are violated and its impact on economic phenomena.
This issue has become of interest recently in the international trade literature, where substantial
evidence has been found that international trade flows are vastly lower than those predicted by
theory (see, e.g., Trefler, 1995, and McCallum, 1995).  One possible reason for this “missing”
trade is that many agents may be unaware of, or unable to exploit, profitable trading
opportunities.  The importance of personal, social, and business connections, or “networks”, may
have an important role in overcoming such barriers.  There have been a number of papers that
have examined this issue recently and Rauch (2001) provides an overview of the role
transnational networks play in overcoming (or creating) informal barriers to trade such as
inadequate information or poor contract enforceability.  As Rauch (2001) states, empirical
evidence is leading theory in the investigation of the role of networks on international trade.
One line of research has examined the role of immigrants as information brokers.
Personal and business connections with the country of origin serve to lower transaction costs for
both importing and exporting by immigrant populations.  For example, immigrants may supply
agents in the country of origin with information on what is in demand in the host country, as well
as which products are available for export (Rauch and Feenstra, 1999).  Using a gravity model of
trade to estimate determinants of U.S. bilateral trade flows, Gould (1994) finds that the stock of
U.S. immigrants from the partner country have a substantial positive impact on both U.S. imports
from and U.S. exports to that partner country. Head and Ries (1998) use a similar empirical
specification to Gould to study Canadian trade patterns, though they also distinguish between
3three different types of immigrants: family, refugee and independent.  They also find evidence
that immigrant stocks increase trade in both directions, though the estimated effects are generally
smaller that those found by Gould for the U.S.  They show that independent immigrants, who are
the most likely to have links in the home country, have the largest effect on imports and exports.
A final important paper in this area is Rauch and Trindade (forthcoming) that examine the effect
of Chinese populations in partner countries on trade flows.1  They argue that network
connections should be more important for trade in differentiated products than homogeneous
products with observable, uniform “reference” prices on world markets.  Their empirical analysis
confirms that the effect of common Chinese ethnic populations has a larger impact on bilateral
trade in differentiated products that for reference-priced products.
In the past two decades, globalization of firms' operations has significantly included
foreign direct investment (FDI) activity. The existence of personal and social networking effects
in trade presents the question of whether such an effect can be documented with respect to FDI,
since the informational and legal uncertainties associated with expansion into foreign countries
through FDI are not unlike those firms encounter when expanding through trade.2  For example,
Caves (1996) suggests that firms undertaking FDI in a new geographical region are more likely
to do so through a joint venture, since partnering up with a local company helps reduce
operational risk associated with inadequate information.
Unlike with trade, FDI is almost exclusively the domain of larger firms.  Thus, following
previous studies in their methodology of examining networking effects through immigrant
                                                          
1  Also related is the work by Greif (1993,1994) which documents the various network features of Maghribi traders
of the eleventh-century Mediterranean.
2  A small set of papers has found evidence that Japanese business groups (or networks) may promote greater FDI
activity.  These include Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996), Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995), and Blonigen, Ellis
and Fausten (2000). The evidence primarily shows such effects for business groups that have vertical linkages,
making it difficult to identify whether such FDI-promoting effects are due to informational advantages of
networking or other agglomeration externalities.
4population changes may not be appropriate for identifying networking effects with FDI activity.
Thus, rather than focus on immigrant populations and their characteristics, this paper examines
characteristics of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of larger firms to see if their networking
connections with foreign markets means greater FDI activities by the firms they lead.  Over the
past decade, an increasing amount of anecdotal information attests to the fact that companies
who wish to become more international seek to hire or promote foreign-born persons to the
position of CEO. The appointment of Egyptian-born Samir Gibara at the helm of Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. in January 1996 is only one example.  In the months leading up to the change of
leadership, large institutional investors such as Alliance Capital and Travelers Group were
aggressively buying Goodyear's stock. One reason for increasing their positions was "the
confidence about Mr. Gibara's centerpiece strategy: overseas growth" (New York Times, March
3, 1996). At the time, this strategy amounted to not only increasing sales abroad, but also setting
up more new plants in foreign countries.
While the example of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. illustrates a change in company
strategy that was initiated with the hiring of a new foreign-born CEO, other anecdotal evidence
suggests that a foreign-born person was promoted to the CEO position as part of a company's
strategy to boost overseas operations.  An example of the latter is the appointment of German-
born Michael H. Spindler as CEO of Apple Computer Inc. in 1986.  Facing stiff competition
from IBM at the time, Mr. Spindler's inauguration goal was to boost the company's foreign sales
from 22% of revenues to 35% (Business Week, February 10, 1986).  In a candid remark about
heritage as a strategy, Gordon Kreh, CEO of Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co.
says: "Your experience gives you insight.... Coming from abroad, I have more of a global
perspective" (The Hartford Courant, March 10, 1997).
5Using a sample of 211 U.S. firms that were part of the manufacturing section of the
Standard and Poor’s 500 over the period 1992-97, we examine whether changes to CEOs with
foreign-market connections leads these firms to subsequently have higher proportions of foreign
assets or affiliate sales.  Our primary measure of foreign-networked CEOs is whether these
individuals have been either foreign-born or educated, though we also examine other observable
indicators of CEO backgrounds to measure foreign-connectedness.  Our empirical results show
that, holding other factors constant, the proportion of a firm’s assets and sales that are in foreign
countries (foreign asset and sales intensities) increase when companies change from U.S. born
and educated CEOs to foreign born and educated CEOs.  In contrast, foreign asset and sales
intensities show little evidence for CEO changes that involve only U.S. born and educated
individuals.  Thus, to the extent that CEO heritage can serve as a proxy for links between the
multinational enterprise and foreign regions of operation, the results in this study lend evidence
in support of networking effects in FDI activity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section describes our empirical
framework.  Section three describes the data sample construction and briefly provides descriptive
statistics. Section four discusses the empirical results and section five concludes.
2. Empirical Methodology.
Our empirical analysis seeks to quantify the effect of a CEO’s cultural, geographic,
institutional, and linguistic knowledge of foreign regions on the company’s foreign affiliate
activities.  In previous literature, the determinants of FDI have been traditionally examined
within the ownership-location-internalization (OLI) framework developed by Dunning (1977).
Most empirical studies of firm’s FDI activities have found that firms that are larger and have
6greater proxies for firm-specific intangible assets (e.g., R&D and advertising intensity) are also
more likely to have multinational production and sales activities.3  The main premise of our
exploration is that knowledge and connections to foreign regions by a CEO can be viewed as
another type of intangible asset that reduces search costs (and perhaps other costs) and therefore
encourages the company to increase its foreign market position, everything else equal.
Given available data (described more below) we focus on two measures of foreign
market position by a firm: foreign asset intensity and foreign sales intensity.  Foreign asset
intensity is defined as a firm’s foreign assets as a proportion of its total assets, while foreign sales
intensity is foreign affiliate sales to total firm sales.  We use these intensity measures, rather than
levels of foreign assets and sales, since a firm’s size can greatly influence that level of these
foreign-market activities.  Our testing equation is then the following:
                  F_INTit   =  α +  β1RDINTit + β2 ADINTit  +∑ = −+−λn 0j jt,i1jt,i USFOR
                                              + ∑ = −+−θn 0j jt,i1jt,i CEOSWITCH   + εit,                                (1)
where i indexes firms and t indexes years.  F_INT represents our foreign intensity variables:
foreign-asset intensity, which we label as FAINT in our tables below, and foreign-sales intensity,
which we label FSINT.   As control variables we include a lagged dependent variable and R&D
intensity (RDINTit) and advertising intensity variables (ADINTit).4  The latter two variables are
proxy variables for firm-specific intangible assets that others have found increase FDI activity.
The next set of variables is comprised of indicator variables for various changes in CEOs
for a firm, which allow for the possibility of lagged responses.  USFOR is our main focus
variable which takes the value of “1” when the firm has changed from a U.S.-connected CEO to
                                                          
3 For example, see Morck and Yeung (1992), Pugel et al. (1996), Kogut and Chang (1996), and Belderbos (1997).
7a foreign-connected CEO.  Our hypothesis is that the estimated coefficients (λs) on this variable
are positive due to networking effects.  The management literature has noted that CEO changes
in general can lead to substantial changes in the operations of firms.  Thus, as a control, we also
include indicator variables for any CEO changes that occur, which we label CEOSWITCH.  It’s
not clear what expected signs should be for the coefficients on the CEOSWITCH variables.
Given this setup, the coefficients on the USFOR variables will give us the extra effect of a CEO
switch from U.S. to foreign-connected on our dependent variables.
We note that a contemporaneous correlation between a new foreign-connected CEO and
foreign asset and sales intensities may be difficult to interpret due to endogeneity concerns.  Is
the new CEO leading to greater foreign market participation or the firm’s growth in these areas is
leading the firm to have a foreign CEO?5  As our results reveal below, the significant
correlations take place in a lagged fashion, not contemporaneously, largely alleviating this
concern over causation.
Finally, we also include yearly dummies in our regressions to control for macroeconomic
factors, such as exchange rate movements, and will also examine the inclusion of firm-fixed
effects to control for time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity.6  εit is an assumed mean-zero
error term.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4 RDINT is constructed as R&D expenditures divided by total assets and ADINT is advertising expenditures divided
by the firm’s total assets.
5 A few of our firms have a foreign-connected CEO throughout our sample of years.  Our concern about endogeneity
is why we do not exploit this variation in our data.
6 Firms in our sample have varying fiscal years and all variables that vary over time, except the time dummies, are
measured over the associated firm’s fiscal years.  This means though that there is not a one-to-one correspondence
with our time dummies and the other time-varying covariates unless the firm’s fiscal year corresponds perfectly with
the calendar year.  This occurs in about half our sample of firms.  Despite this issue, tests for joint significance of the
year dummies support their inclusion in our regressions below.
83. Data.
To estimate equation (1) we construct a sample of the 211 firms that were listed in the
manufacturing section of the S&P 500 during some or all of the 1992-1997 period.  Since the
objective of this study is to look at networking in FDI, non-manufacturing firms were not
considered in the empirical estimation for two reasons.  First, the assets of non-manufacturing
companies such as financial institutions perform differently from those of manufacturing
companies, which invest in production facilities abroad.  Second, it is not clear that companies in
sectors such as services and retail have the option to expand into foreign countries because of
regulatory restrictions, and therefore comparison of asset intensity between these sectors and
manufacturing will present difficulties with interpretation of the results.
Construction of the sample began with 269 manufacturing firms in the S&P 500, out of
which 211 companies had complete data for the 6 years that span the period 1992 through 1997.
The choice of timeframe is restricted by the availability of useable data in the S&P's Compustat
database from which most of the data were collected.  Specifically, reporting of firms’ foreign
operations, in what is known as the Geographic Segments section of Compustat, was not
mandatory until 1992.  Data for years beyond 1997 were excluded due to regulatory changes in
accounting practices that make comparisons of figures in 1997 with subsequent years unreliable7.
The Industrial Annual Segment of the S&P's Compustat database was the source for
annual data on firms' assets, sales, R&D expenditures, and advertising expenditures.  Data on
                                                          
7 On June 30, 1997, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the pronouncement for the Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131, Disclosure about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information
(SAFS 131). The statement establishes the standards for the way companies will report information related to
operating segments in their annual and interim financial reports. SFAS 131 has elected to make the new reporting
more relevant than consistent or reliable.
9firms’ foreign assets and foreign sales8 were obtained using the Geographic Segment of the same
database.
As noted in the discussion above, there are two sets of dummy variables capturing
information about CEO switches within firms.  USFOR is an indicator that the previous CEO
was U.S. and the incoming CEO is “foreign-connected.”  Within our sample, 12 firms have a
switch at some point from a U.S. to a foreign CEO out of 138 total CEO switches.  CEO
switches can be discerned through the Compustat database which records the names of firms’
officers on annual basis.  To classify switches as one that led to a “foreign” CEO we gathered
data on whether the company's previous and new CEOs were foreign-born or foreign-educated
through searches of newspaper articles announcing CEO changes from Academic Universe
(Lexus-Nexus) searchable database and bibliographical information contained in the S&P's
Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives.9  Information on CEO heritage revealed that
with a few exceptions, foreign-born executives are also foreign educated, and there are no
instances of U.S.-born executives that earned their degrees abroad.  Thus, we classify a CEO as
“foreign-connected” if either one of the two criteria are satisfied.
Tables 1 and 2 document some general differences between companies with foreign-
connected CEOs versus U.S. CEOs in our sample.  Table 1 shows that, on average, companies
with foreign-born CEOs have both higher foreign sales and higher foreign assets compared to
companies with U.S.-born CEOs. The minimum and maximum size measures show that there is
significant variation in average size of sales and assets.  Table 2 presents a more precise
distribution of firms in five ranges. The most populous range is that in which total assets and
                                                          
8 The data for foreign sales in Compustat represent annual sales by foreign affiliates and subsidiaries, which does not
include exports by the parent firm.
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total sales are between 1 and 5 billion dollars.  In contrast, the range with the least companies is
that in which total company assets or sales exceed 50 billion dollars.
Descriptive statistics for our dependent variables are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  Table 3
shows that relative to companies with U.S.-born CEOs, foreign sales and foreign asset intensities
in companies headed by executives with foreign heritage are on average higher by 32 and 37
percent respectively.  Once again, the minimum and maximum intensity measures suggest
significant variation.  To further understand what level of foreign-asset and foreign-sales
intensity is most common among firms in the sample, five ranges of intensities were constructed.
As shown in Table 4, the most populous range is that in which foreign sales and foreign assets
are between 20 and 50 percent of total sales and total assets respectively.  In contrast, the range
with the least companies is that in which total foreign sales and foreign assets are over 80 percent
of total sales and total assets respectively.
4. Empirical Results.
Equation (1) was estimated for both of our foreign market intensity variables for the 1266
observations in our sample (211 companies over six years) and the results are presented in Table
5.  For our CEO switching variables we begin by including both one- and two-period lags.
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below our coefficient estimates.
Both regressions have statistically significant F-statistics for overall joint significance of
the regressors, with most of the regressor statistically significant and of expected sign.  F-tests
suggest that year effects are not jointly significant, though they are significant when we include
firm fixed-effects, discussed below.  The coefficients on R&D and advertising intensity are
                                                                                                                                                                                          
9 Newspaper announcements of CEO changes at large firms are surprisingly consistent at giving fairly detailed
bibliographical information about the incoming and outgoing CEOs.
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positive, as expected, and statistically significant.  This is consistent with the FDI internalization
hypothesis that firms with greater intangible assets are more likely to internalize transactions by
establishing plants in foreign markets.
We next turn to our variables of interest, the CEO switching variables.  In the foreign-
asset intensity regression, two of the three coefficients on the CEO switch variables are
statistically negative.  In fact, the cumulative effect of the CEO switch variables is a 10.5
percentage point drop in a firm’s foreign-asset intensity over the first three years of the new
CEOs tenure.  This translates into a very substantial decrease, given our sample foreign-asset
intensity average of 25.1%, and is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.  This
suggests that CEO switches generally lead to a firm reducing its foreign-asset intensity.  One
explanation is that CEO switches occur when firms are not performing well, and such changes
cause firms to focus more on domestic operations.  The decline in foreign-sales intensity is also
large (7.4 percentage point cumulative decline) relative to the sample average foreign-sales
intensity of 28.7%.
In contrast, all three coefficients on our USFOR variables are positive in both regression
equations, with both the contemporaneous and two-year lagged variables statistically significant.
Our estimates imply that a company experiencing a switch from a U.S. CEO to a foreign
connected one leads the firm to increase their foreign-asset intensity approximately 22.5
percentage points higher than firms with other CEO switches. Likewise, the coefficients suggest
foreign-sales intensity increases 20.4 percentage points over the first three years of a U.S.-to-
foreign CEO switch compared to other CEO switches.  Combined, the coefficients suggest that a
firm switching from a U.S. to a foreign-connected CEO increases its foreign-asset intensity by 12
percentage points and its foreign-sales intensity by 13 percentage points compared to a firm that
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has no CEO switch.10  If we exclude the contemporaneous switching variables due to
endogeneity concerns, the increase in foreign-asset intensity and foreign-sales intensities for a
switch to a foreign-connected CEO is yield 7-8 percentage point increases over firms.
While our F-statistic for both regressions in Table 5 are statistically significant, the R2s
are relatively low.  One possibility is that foreign market participation by firms may be due to a
variety of unobserved firm characteristics that are not captured by our advertising and R&D
intensity variables.  Assuming these unobserved firm-specific features are invariant over our
sample time period, we control for such factors with firm-level fixed effects and present these
estimates in Table 6.
R2s for both equations go up substantially and F-tests strongly support the inclusion of
firm-level fixed effects.  The estimates of the other regressors in both equations change
substantially. The coefficients on our CEOSWITCH variables are no longer statistically
negative, suggesting no general effect of a CEO switch on foreign market participation by a firm.
The coefficients on the U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch variables are still positive, as expected,
though only the second annual lag coefficient is statistically significant.   The marginal effect of
a U.S.-to-foreign switch is much reduced, suggesting approximately a three percentage point (or
roughly 10-15%) increase in both the foreign asset- and sales-intensity of the firm relative to
other firms in the sample.  R&D intensity continues to have the correct sign with firm fixed-
effects included, but is no longer statistically significant.  Advertising intensity reverses sign and
is statistically significant.  The poor performance of these control variables is clearly due to the
inclusion of firm fixed effects, since inclusion of such effects means that the other coefficient
estimates are identified solely from the time series dimension of the data.  Annual changes in
                                                          
10 Given our setup, this marginal effect is calculated as USFOR + USFORt-1 + USFORt-2 + CEOSWITCH +
CEOSWITCHt-1 + CEOSWITCHt-2.  These marginal effects are statistically significant at approximately the 95%
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R&D intensity and advertising intensity may not be very informative for understanding changes
in foreign market participation, whereas levels of these variables, which proxy for a firm’s stock
of intangible assets, are obviously correlated with a firm’s long-run foreign market participation.
While we expected a lag effect in our CEO switch variables due to the time for a new
CEO to change the direction of the relatively large firms in our sample, the results in Table 6
suggest that we may not have included enough lags and may be missing the full effect of such
switches.  In Table 7 we include five years of lags for our CEO switch variables and present
estimates from a firm fixed-effects specification.  The inclusion of further lags is important, as
the positive effects from a U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch primarily occur in the second through
fourth year after the CEO switch for both the foreign asset- and sales-intensity variables.  The
combined effect on foreign-asset intensity for the five years following a U.S.-to-foreign CEO
switch is 16.6 percentage points (or 66% of the mean) increase and statistically significant at the
99% confidence level.  Similarly, the combined effect on foreign-sales intensity for the five years
following a U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch is 21.2 percentage points (or 74% of the mean) increase.
The coefficients on the general CEOSWITCH variables are small and statistically insignificant,
indicating that these marginal effects of the U.S.-to-foreign switch are relative to all other firms
in the sample, regardless of whether they had a CEO switch or not.
A final concern with our specification and sample used in Table 7 is that our sample
includes a few firms that changed CEOs due to a merger of two large firms, including the merger
of Pharmacia and Upjohn which is recorded as a U.S.-to-foreign switch in our data.  Mergers can
obviously lead to large discrete changes in the firm’s balance sheet and may provide spurious
results in our regressions.  Table 8 presents estimates using the same specification as Table 7, but
dropping the seven firms in our sample that experienced CEO switches due to mergers.  While
                                                                                                                                                                                          
confidence level for both regressions.
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the coefficients on the USFOR variables continue to be positive and show a similar pattern,
dropping the merged firms does lead to smaller marginal effects.  The combined effect on
foreign-asset and -sales intensities for the five years following a U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch are
now 7.4 and 14 percentage points, respectively.  These effects are still substantial relative to the
sample averages (, which are not significantly changed by the dropping of the seven merged
firms.  Another feature of the USFOR coefficients is that the majority of the increase in foreign-
sales intensity from a U.S.-to-foreign switch lags by a year or two the primary increase in
foreign-asset intensity.  This accords with the intuition that new sales in a region may lag the
establishment of new production assets in a foreign region.
Table 8 represents our preferred specification.  We also tried including a lagged
dependent variable to control for remaining persistence in foreign market participation not
identified by the firm fixed-effects.  While the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables are
statistically significant (around 0.4 for both regressions) the coefficients on the other control
variables are hardly changed.
In Table 9, we try another experiment.  We have a number of instances where a firm
experiences a CEO switch from a foreign-born or educated CEO to a U.S. CEO.   One
hypothesis is that we should expect negative effects on foreign-market participation from such a
switch.  On the other hand, if the U.S.-to-foreign results are due to additional foreign networking
that the foreign-connected CEO has established for the firm, it is not clear that these connections
will necessarily dissipate.  If establishing a foreign connection is primarily a fixed sunk cost,
then there may be a beachhead effect such that a change back to a U.S. CEO does not
significantly impact a firm’s foreign market participation.  Table 9 presents results when we run
the same sample and specification as in Table 8, but not include contemporaneous and lagged
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dummy variables to capture effects from a foreign-to-U.S. CEO switch.  The first four years of a
foreign-to-U.S. CEO switch indicate negative effects on both foreign-asset and –sales intensities.
However, the combined effects are not as large as the coefficients on the U.S.-to-foreign CEO
switch variables and also not statistically significant.  Thus, the evidence for a reversal effect is
fairly weak, perhaps due to beachhead effects.
To this point we have used foreign birth or education as the sole indication of foreign
connections for an individual. But there may be other ways in which U.S.-born and –educated
individuals may establish important connections.  To explore this we examined biographical
information on CEO’s previous experiences to see if they had either run an “international”
section of a firm’s operations and/or lived abroad for a significant amount of time.  Using this
definition of “foreign” connections we created alternative variables for U.S.-to-foreign CEO
switches (ALT USFOR) and include these in our specification in Table 10 with five year lags to
be consistent with the other CEO switch variables.  Interestingly, there is no consistent effect
seen in these U.S.-to-foreign switches using the alternative, more-inclusive definition of a
foreign-connected CEO.  Other variables, including our standard U.S.-to-foreign CEO switch
variables are essentially unchanged.
5. Conclusion.
Over the past decade, there has been a growing amount of research that finds evidence
that networking effects are important in understanding international trade flows.  This is the first
paper (of which we are aware) that examines the extent to which networking through personal
connections are present in firms’ FDI activity.  Using bibliographical information on CEOs’ birth
and education locations, we are able to identify changes from U.S.- to foreign-connected CEOs
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that occurred in manufacturing firms of the S&P 500 from 1992 through 1997.  Our preferred
estimates (Table 8) show that a U.S. firm’s switch from a U.S.- to foreign-connected CEO leads
to 30% and 50% increases in that firm’s proportion of its assets and sales, respectively, that are
in foreign markets over the 5 years following the switch.  This is in contrast to other CEO
switches in our sample that show no evidence of changes in these proportions after the switch.
We also find only weak evidence that switches from a foreign-to-U.S. CEO lead to decrease in a
firm’s foreign market participation.   These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence, which
suggests that many of the firms who have elected foreign-born CEOs have done so in an effort to
become more international.   Importantly, our methodology is set up to show that firms become
more international subsequent to hiring a foreign-connected CEO, not in anticipation of such a
change.
There are a number of avenues for future that we wish to pursue, most likely in future
drafts of this paper.  First, it’s possible that changes to foreign-connected individuals in other
officer positions of a company may lead to observable changes in the firm’s operations that are
consistent with our hypothesis.  Second, our sample is of the largest U.S. firms.  It would be
useful to see whether such effects are observable in smaller firms, particularly those in certain
industries where global trade and FDI activity are most prevalent.
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics for companies in sample:
Total assets and total sales averaged by company
over the period 1992-97
 Average Total Sales ($MM) Average Total Assets ($MM)
 
Companies with
U.S.-Born CEOs
(N = 186)
Companies with
Foreign-Born
CEOs
(N = 28)
All Companies
(N = 214)
Companies with
U.S.-born CEOs
(N = 186)
Companies with
foreign-born
CEOs
(N = 28)
All Companies
(N = 214)
Mean    8,530  12,504  10,660    9,904   15,679    9,050
Median    3,555    5,714    3,749    3,695    4,771    3,627
Maximum 152,115 129,129 152,115 240,553 230,681 240,553
Minimum       318       629       318      216       381       216
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics for companies in sample:
Distribution of companies by range of total assets and total sales
over the period 1992-97
 
Distribution of Companies'
Average Total Sales by Range
Distribution of Companies'
Average Total Assets by Range
 
Number of
Companies with
U.S.-Born CEOs
Number of
Companies with
Foreign-Born CEOs
All
Companies
Number of
Companies with
U.S.-Born CEOs
Number of
Companies with
Foreign-Born CEOs
All
Companies
             $$ <   1 bn 16   1   17 18   2   20
  1 bn < $$ <   5 bn 95 13 108 90 13 103
  5 bn < $$ < 10 bn 34   6   40 33   7   40
10 bn < $$ < 50 bn 36   6   42 42   4   46
50 bn < $$   5   2    7   3     2     5
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TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics for companies in sample: Foreign-asset and foreign-sales intensities
averaged by company over the sample period 1992-97
 
Average Foreign-Sales Intensity
(Percent of Total Sales)
Average Foreign-Asset Intensity
(Percent of Total Assets)
 
Companies with
U.S.-born CEOs
(N = 186)
Companies with
foreign-born CEOs (N
= 28)
All
Companies
(N = 214)
Companies with
U.S.-born CEOs
(N = 186)
Companies with
foreign-born CEOs (N
= 28)
All
Companies
(N = 214)
Mean   28 37   29 24 33 25
Median   27 43   28 23 36 25
Maximum 137 67 137 94 68 94
Minimum    0  5    0  0  0  0
TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics for companies in sample: Distribution of companies
by range of foreign-asset and foreign-sales intensities over the period 1992-97
 
Distribution of Companies'
Average Foreign-Sales Intensity by Range
Distribution of Companies'
Average Foreign-Asset Intensity by Range
 
Number of
Companies with
U.S.-Born CEOs
Number of
Companies with
Foreign-Born CEOs
All
Companies
Number of
Companies with
U.S.-Born CEOs
Number of
Companies with
Foreign-Born CEOs
All
Companies
  0 < % < 10 48   4  52 48   3  51
10 < % < 20 23   1  24 29   4  33
20 < % < 50 92 16 108 95 18 113
50 < % < 80 19   7  26 13   3  16
Over 80%   4   0    4  1   0    1
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TABLE 5. OLS Estimates of CEO Foreign Connections Effects on Foreign-Sales
and Foreign-Asset Intensities.
Explanatory
Variables
  Foreign-Asset Intensity
(N = 1266)
  Foreign-Sales Intensity
(N = 1266)
USFOR    8.59**
(3.71)
 7.85*
(4.21)
USFOR(t-1) 4.45
(3.32)
4.52
(4.16)
USFOR(t-2)    9.43**
(3.71)
 8.02*
(4.16)
CEOSWITCH                - 4.31***
(1.50)
                - 2.75
(1.92)
CEOSWITCH(t-1)                - 2.21
(1.55)
                - 1.47
(1.90)
CEOSWITCH(t-2) - 3.97**
(1.60)
                - 3.22*
 (1.78)
RDINT    1.14***
(0.12)
    1.68***
 (0.14)
ADINT                  0.77***
(0.15)
                  0.90***
(0.17)
Year Dummies YES YES
R-squared   0.11   0.15
F-Statistic 12.91 17.90
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, and *, denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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TABLE 6. Firm Fixed-Effects Estimates of CEO Foreign Connections Effects on
Foreign-Sales and Foreign-Asset Intensities.
Explanatory
Variables
  Foreign-Asset Intensity
(N = 1266)
  Foreign-Sales Intensity
(N = 1266)
USFOR 1.77
(2.32)
0.69
(1.90)
USFOR(t-1) 0.12
(1.75)
                - 0.31
(1.29)
USFOR(t-2)   3.21**
(1.61)
  3.08**
(1.49)
CEOSWITCH                - 0.83
(0.64)
                - 0.45
                 (0.61)
CEOSWITCH(t-1)                  0.42
(0.54)
                  0.01
(0.53)
CEOSWITCH(t-2)                - 0.41
(0.64)
                - 0.94
(0.87)
RDINT 0.37
(0.24)
 0.26*
(0.15)
ADINT                  0.79***
(0.20)
                - 0.27
(0.18)
Year Dummies YES YES
R-squared  0.92   0.94
F-Statistic  4.51   5.24
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, and *, denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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TABLE 7. Firm Fixed-Effects Estimates of CEO Foreign Connections Effects on
Foreign-Sales and Foreign-Asset Intensities: Five Years of Lags.
Explanatory
Variables
  Foreign-Asset Intensity
(N = 1266)
  Foreign-Sales Intensity
(N = 1266)
USFOR 3.31
(2.35)
2.78
(1.91)
USFOR(t-1) 1.96
(1.85)
                  2.16
(1.46)
USFOR(t-2)     5.18***
(1.80)
    5.79***
(1.76)
USFOR(t-3)   4.44**
(2.01)
                  5.57***
(1.77)
USFOR(t-4)  3.98*
(2.34)
    5.44***
(1.76)
USFOR(t-5) 1.03
(1.78)
                  2.26
(1.65)
CEOSWITCH                - 0.82
(0.69)
                - 0.50
                 (0.63)
CEOSWITCH(t-1)                  0.37
(0.62)
                - 0.10
(0.62)
CEOSWITCH(t-2)                - 0.51
(0.75)
                - 1.13
(0.99)
CEOSWITCH(t-3)                - 0.11
(0.69)
                - 0.26
(0.62)
CEOSWITCH(t-4)                - 0.07
(0.65)
                - 0.36
(0.60)
CEOSWITCH(t-5)                - 0.51
(0.76)
                - 0.59
(0.76)
RDINT 0.35
(0.24)
                  0.24
(0.15)
ADINT                - 0.78***
(0.20)
                - 0.24
(0.17)
Year Dummies YES YES
R-squared  0.92   0.94
F-Statistic  3.07   4.18
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, and *, denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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TABLE 8. Firm Fixed-Effects Estimates of CEO Foreign Connections Effects on
Foreign-Sales and Foreign-Asset Intensities: Dropping Merged Firms.
Explanatory
Variables
  Foreign-Asset Intensity
(N = 1224)
  Foreign-Sales Intensity
(N = 1224)
USFOR                  1.72
(1.12)
1.56
(1.23)
USFOR(t-1)  1.92*
(1.03)
                  1.90*
(0.97)
USFOR(t-2)   3.02**
(1.19)
    4.02***
(1.33)
USFOR(t-3)                  1.74
(1.12)
                  3.54***
(1.24)
USFOR(t-4)                  1.18
(1.31)
    3.47***
(1.23)
USFOR(t-5)                - 0.51
(1.63)
                  1.04
(1.49)
CEOSWITCH                - 0.77
(0.69)
                - 0.42
                 (0.64)
CEOSWITCH(t-1)                  0.09
(0.62)
                - 0.40
(0.62)
CEOSWITCH(t-2)                - 0.92
(0.76)
                - 1.50
(1.02)
CEOSWITCH(t-3)                - 0.61
(0.68)
                - 0.61
(0.63)
CEOSWITCH(t-4)                - 0.38
(0.67)
                - 0.58
(0.62)
CEOSWITCH(t-5)                - 0.42
(0.79)
                - 0.51
(0.80)
RDINT 0.37
(0.24)
                  0.24
(0.16)
ADINT                - 0.57***
(0.17)
                - 0.07
(0.15)
Year Dummies YES YES
R-squared  0.92   0.95
F-Statistic  3.13   4.26
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, and *, denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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TABLE 9. Firm Fixed-Effects Estimates of CEO Foreign Connections Effects on
Foreign-Sales and Foreign-Asset Intensities: Examining Foreign to U.S. CEO Switches.
Explanatory
Variables
  Foreign-Asset Intensity
(N = 1224)
  Foreign-Sales Intensity
(N = 1224)
USFOR 1.64
(1.14)
1.49
(1.21)
USFOR(t-1) 1.67
(1.07)
                  1.82*
(0.99)
USFOR(t-2)   2.74**
(1.21)
    4.05***
(1.40)
USFOR(t-3)                  1.47
(1.13)
                  3.42***
(1.18)
USFOR(t-4)                  1.27
(1.38)
    3.57***
(1.27)
USFOR(t-5)                - 0.01
(1.64)
                  1.37
(1.54)
CEOSWITCH                - 0.60
(0.71)
                - 0.30
                 (0.67)
CEOSWITCH(t-1)                  0.39
(0.63)
                - 0.30
(0.65)
CEOSWITCH(t-2)                - 0.59
(0.77)
                - 1.41
(1.08)
CEOSWITCH(t-3)                - 0.28
(0.71)
                - 0.50
(0.66)
CEOSWITCH(t-4)                - 0.42
(0.70)
                - 0.67
(0.66)
CEOSWITCH(t-5)                - 0.75
(0.80)
                - 0.69
(0.82)
FORUS                - 1.09
(1.92)
                - 1.35
(1.56)
FORUS(t-1)                - 2.13
(2.34)
                - 0.76
(1.39)
FORUS(t-2)                - 1.60
(2.29)
                - 0.54
(1.64)
FORUS(t-3)                - 1.83
(1.79)
                - 0.69
(1.62)
FORUS(t-4) 0.53
(1.43)
0.53
(1.43)
FORUS(t-5)                  3.44
(2.87)
                  1.72
(3.63)
RDINT 0.35
(0.24)
                  0.23
(0.16)
ADINT                - 0.58***
(0.17)
                - 0.07
(0.14)
Year Dummies YES YES
R-squared  0.92   0.95
F-Statistic  2.55   3.33
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, and *, denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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TABLE 10. Firm Fixed-Effects Estimates of CEO Foreign Connections Effects on
Foreign-Sales and Foreign-Asset Intensities: Examining Alternative Definition of Foreign
Connections.
Explanatory
Variables
  Foreign-Asset Intensity
(N = 1224)
  Foreign-Sales Intensity
(N = 1224)
USFOR 1.37
(1.25)
1.42
(1.30)
USFOR(t-1) 1.72
(1.09)
                  1.93*
(1.07)
USFOR(t-2)  2.34*
(1.20)
   3.59**
(1.42)
USFOR(t-3)                  1.59
(1.16)
                  3.39***
(1.26)
USFOR(t-4)                  1.31
(1.34)
    3.42***
(1.26)
USFOR(t-5)                - 0.59
(1.65)
                  0.83
(1.47)
CEOSWITCH                - 0.81
(0.77)
                - 0.37
                 (0.71)
CEOSWITCH(t-1)                  0.19
(0.65)
                - 0.33
(0.66)
CEOSWITCH(t-2)                - 0.28
(0.74)
                - 1.03
(1.13)
CEOSWITCH(t-3)                - 0.54
(0.71)
                - 0.45
(0.66)
CEOSWITCH(t-4)                - 0.59
(0.68)
                - 0.55
(0.65)
CEOSWITCH(t-5)                - 0.39
(0.79)
                - 0.33
(0.74)
ALT USFOR 0.46
(1.03)
                - 0.55
                 (1.24)
ALT USFOR(t-1)                - 0.06
(1.36)
                - 0.47
(1.42)
ALT USFOR(t-2)                - 2.92
(1.79)
                - 2.78
(1.80)
ALT USFOR(t-3)                  0.98
(1.34)
                - 0.92
(1.31)
ALT USFOR(t-4)                  2.76**
(1.36)
                - 0.18
(1.44)
ALT USFOR(t-5)                  0.42
(2.10)
                - 1.76
(3.30)
RDINT 0.37
(0.24)
                  0.23
(0.16)
ADINT                - 0.57***
(0.17)
                - 0.08
(0.14)
Year Dummies YES YES
R-squared  0.92   0.95
F-Statistic  3.45   3.53
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, and *, denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
